Friday, August 07, 2026

‘Not afforded any dignity or humanity’: the children’s hospitals England has not examined...

‘Some children and young people were not afforded any dignity or humanity’, Ruth Innes KC, Senior Counsel to the Scottish Child Abuse Inquiry, said that last October, closing the evidence on the institutions where disabled and chronically ill children were sent to live. England and Wales ran institutions of the same kind, and some of the children sent to them are still alive.

Scotland is asking what happened in them. In April, the Inquiry published research it had commissioned into the abuse of disabled children in residential institutions, and the finding was that the evidence barely exists: patterns of failure can be traced across the UK and internationally, but the record is too thin to establish what happened, or to draw the lessons that would protect such children now. England and Wales are not asking.hart 

Phase 9 of the Scottish Child Abuse Inquiry’s investigations examined residential care for children and young people with long-term healthcare needs, additional support needs, and disabilities. There were forty-three days of hearings, 133 witnesses, seventeen institutions, with care provided by the National Health Service, local authorities, and voluntary and private bodies. The emergent themes include failures to listen to children, inadequate training, excessive restraint and sedation, and leadership that was ‘autocratic, dysfunctional or absent’. Sixteen volumes of findings have been published. Those relating to Phase 9 are still to come.

Northern Ireland covered comparable ground earlier. The Hart Inquiry’s remit ran from 1922 to 1995 and expressly included hospitals. It produced an apology delivered in the Assembly Chamber in March 2022, and a redress board that had received 5,496 applications by the time it closed to new claims on 2 April 2025. England and Wales have neither asked nor apologised.

The absence is not for want of a subject. Between 1900 and 1950 bovine tuberculosis, contracted from infected milk, killed more than 800,000 people in England and Wales and disabled many more, working-class children disproportionately among them. Those with osteoarticular disease could spend years in orthopaedic institutions, immobilised in plaster, on unheated open-air wards, with parents allowed an hour’s visit once a month. In 1937 a two-and-a-half-year-old boy was taken from his mother’s arms in Sheffield to the King Edward VII Memorial Hospital for Crippled Children in the Rivelin Valley. He spent much of the next five years there. He described the ward in the plainest terms: ‘Hospital life was organised, but crude. There was nothing to soften it. It was lonely, but I couldn’t name the feeling then.’ A nurse had told him that when the hands on the clock reached a certain place, his mother would come. ‘Of course,’ he said, ‘she never did.’

He was one of thousands, and his childhood is not the point. The point is that nobody has ever asked, formally, what happened to those children.

Some are still here to say so. Two survivors, both in their eighties, have recently written to me. Bob Shaw spent his childhood hospitalisation at St Cuthbert’s Convalescent Home in Malvern and at St Gerard’s Orthopaedic Hospital in Coleshill, admitted in 1948, just before the founding of the National Health Service. He wrote: ‘I still cannot take it in that this happened to thousands of children. I always thought it was just the hospitals I was in.’ Valerie Muncer, née Poole, was five when she was taken to the Princess Elizabeth Children’s Hospital in Hackney in January 1946. She spent the five years that followed at Hackney, then at Tehidy Sanatorium in Cornwall until 1951, when Tehidy was sold to the NHS, and finally at Falmouth Hospital until she was ten. Writing her own account for her family, she stopped short at what she was recovering: ‘Was this me? This poor child.’ Their institutions differed. The regime did not.

None of this requires hindsight. The Platt Report of 1959 was itself an official acknowledgement that the regime it replaced had harmed children. John Bowlby’s 1951 monograph for the World Health Organization, and the 1952 film A Two-Year-Old Goes to Hospital by James Robertson, a pioneering psychiatric social worker and psychoanalyst who studied childhood separation alongside Bowlby at the Tavistock Clinic, made the case in terms policy-makers understood while children like these were still on the wards. Implementation was glacial: a survey in 1982 still found forty-eight per cent of children’s wards without unrestricted parental access.

England and Wales have examined a version of this problem once. The Ely Hospital Inquiry of 1969, chaired by Geoffrey Howe QC, looked at a long-stay NHS institution in Cardiff whose wards included children, established that isolation from outside scrutiny had allowed harm to persist, and led directly to the Hospital Advisory Service in 1970. That logic was never extended to the orthopaedic and tuberculosis cohort of the pre-antibiotic decades. The Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse addressed only sexual abuse. The Cumberlege Review addressed medicines and devices, but its framing of historical harm through acknowledgement rather than criminal fault is the model that fits here. Most of what was done to these children was lawful and medically endorsed. The case for looking is not to apportion blame. It is to recognise and learn.

Pre-NHS institutional records survive unevenly. Some admission registers and annual reports remain. But the clinical record barely exists as a body of material, and what does survive records the treatment rather than the child. A statutory inquiry under the Inquiries Act 2005 needs a minister to initiate it, and members of the pre-Platt cohort are now in their eighties and nineties. That bar may not be cleared in time. Lower ones are within reach. The Health and Social Care Committee could take historical evidence. The action plan for tuberculosis in England expires this year and its successor, for 2026 to 2031, is being drafted now. The Department of Health and Social Care or the UK Health Security Agency could take the opportunity to commission a historical annex to it. Either would begin what Scotland and Northern Ireland have accepted is warranted: securing the records of institutions that no longer exist, gathering the testimony that survives while those who hold it are alive, and acknowledging that these children were the state’s responsibility.

The Sheffield boy was Harry Drabble. He died in 2022, aged eighty-seven. Shortly before his death he was asked whether he wanted his story kept within the family. He replied: ‘Publish.’ He feared that without the evidence of survivors the mistakes of his era would be made again. The question is not whether the country cares. It is whether it will do what Scotland and Northern Ireland have already done.

About the author

Helen Parker-Drabble is an author, speaker, and independent scholar who recovers ordinary lives from the traces they leave behind. She writes under the series Who Do I Think You Were?®, and her book ‘Yet’: A Story of Triumph over Childhood Separation, Trauma, and Disability (2025) reconstructs her father’s five years in a Sheffield hospital for children with tuberculosis. Her peer-reviewed writing has appeared in Genealogy and The Local Historian. She can be contacted at helen@helenparkerdrabble.com.

https://historyandpolicy.org/opinion-articles/articles/not-afforded-any-dignity-or-humanity-the-childrens-hospitals-england-has-not-examined/

Thursday, August 06, 2026

Former Oxfordshire policeman facing misconduct hearing for 'lies'

Former Police Constable Liam Yeo is accused of falsifying records by allegedly making false and misleading entries into the police database NICHE and a case file.

These entries reportedly indicated he had spoken to a witness.
If found to have falsified the record, the officer would be in breach of the standards of professional behaviour in relation to honesty and integrity, orders and instructions, duties and responsibilities and discreditable conduct.
This means the panel could rule that he would have been dismissed had they still been serving.
In addition, his details could be place on the College of Policing Barred List, which legally prevents him from ever working in policing, the National Crime Agency, or other specific law enforcement and security bodies
The public misconduct hearing will take place virtually on Wednesday, August 5, 2026, at 1.30pm, overseen by Chief Constable Jason Hogg.
The officer, who has since left the force, was based at Didcot Police Station.
A spokesperson for police said: "It is alleged the officer put false and misleading entries into NICHE and a case file, indicating that he had spoken to a witness.
"If found it is alleged that the officer would be in breach of the standards of professional behaviour in relation to honesty and integrity, orders and instructions, duties and responsibilities and discreditable conduct."

Wednesday, August 05, 2026

In Malta Courtroom, Murdered Journalist's Son Describes Last Day With His Mother...

Matthew Caruana Galizia has testified about the assassination of his mother, a journalist who spent years investigating government corruption in Malta. Businessman Yorgen Fenech is alleged to have ordered the 2017 murder of journalist Daphne Caruana Galizia. He has pleaded not guilty.

Matthew Caruana Galizia was at home in Malta working at his laptop on the morning of October 16, 2017, when he heard the explosion that killed his mother, investigative journalist Daphne Caruana Galizia.

Testifying today before a jury in the trial of businessman Yorgen Fenech, who is charged with commissioning the murder, her son described the last hours he spent with her — and the investigations she was pursuing when she died.

Fenech has pleaded not guilty to charges of complicity and criminal association in the case, which is unfolding in a courtroom in Malta’s capital, Valletta. panama 

Daphne Caruana Galizia had spent years reporting on government corruption. She was 53 years old when she was killed by a bomb placed under her car seat and detonated remotely by SMS.  

"My mother made me some lunch. She saw I hadn't eaten anything. She had a phone call and left the house,” Matthew Caruana Galizia testified. 

“She came back in. She had forgotten my dad's chequebook — her account was frozen at the time, and he would sign cheques she could use,” he recalled. “Then she left for the last time."

He was a software programmer at the time, and he went back to his work, with music playing in the background. 

"Soon after she left the house, I heard an extremely loud explosion," Matthew Caruana Galizia testified.

He went down the lane towards the main road, walking faster and faster until he was running. He saw a tall column of smoke.

"I looked through the fire and saw a black shadow in the car. I thought, 'That's my mom.' I looked around to see if there was something I could use to open the door,” he said. “Then I saw a leg on the ground. I thought: for nothing, it's over."

A police car arrived, and officers took out a fire extinguisher. He shouted at them to use it.  "One of them was crying. He told me it was useless," Matthew Caruana Galizia testified.

Before that day, he told the court, he had been a regular person, going to work, taking holidays, spending time with friends. Everything changed the moment his mother was murdered. From then on, he focused on finding her killers. 

"My work became the investigation. It became justice," he said. "I put all of my energy into this. This is not something an ordinary person should do, but we couldn't just sit back and expect things to happen on their own.”

Much of Matthew Caruana Galizia’s testimony concerned the investigation his mother was working on when she was killed. It involved the Electrogas Project, a multi-million euro Maltese government plan to build a new gas power station. Fenech was a shareholder in a company involved in the project.

Keith Schembri, who was chief of staff for then-prime minister Joseph Muscat, testified last week that Fenech had “said things that led me to believe that he might have been the one who did it,” referring to ordering the assasination.

Fenech has alleged that Schembri ordered the murder of Daphne Caruana Galizia, as have two of the three convicted hitmen. Schembri is not charged in the murder case and has rejected the allegations. 

More - 
 https://www.occrp.org/en/news/in-malta-courtroom-murdered-journalists-son-describes-last-day-with-his-mother

Saturday, August 01, 2026

Journalists warn against PSNI chief's offers amid spying allegations...

Two prominent journalists, Trevor Birney and Barry McCaffrey, are advising fellow media professionals not to accept any offers of personal meetings with PSNI Chief Constable Jon Boutcher regarding PSNI spying operations against them.

Their warning follows the latest revelations that the PSNI spied on former BBC journalists Barney Rowan and Vincent Kearney in 2006. Rowan, a former BBC security editor, had his phone monitored by the PSNI after writing a story on the killing of Denis Donaldson in April 2006.

Donaldson was a police and MI5 agent within Sinn Féin.

Boutcher has now offered to meet Rowan in person. “I am happy to meet with him to discuss any issues or concerns he may have,” he told the BBC.

However, Trevor Birney and Barry McCaffrey, the journalists whose legal case first exposed the PSNI spying operation against journalists, have warned reporters from taking up the chief constable’s offer of informal briefings on their individual cases.

“We believe that these offers from the chief constable are a deliberate and cynical attempt to thwart any proper independent scrutiny of the PSNI spying operation against journalists,” said Birney.

The two reporters pointed to a report, commissioned by the chief constable in 2024, in which English barrister Angus McCullough KC was asked to investigate PSNI surveillance of journalists.

“From the very outset of the McCullough Review we questioned why it was only allowed to investigate cases from 2011 to 2023,” McCaffrey explained.

“We repeatedly urged that Angus McCullough be allowed to investigate surveillance against journalists from the formation of the PSNI in 2001 unto the present day.

“We were told by McCullough and others that the chief constable was adamant that the investigation into spying on journalists could not go back prior to 2011.

“We were told this was purely about value for money and nothing else.

“The latest evidence that at least two other journalists were being spied on in 2006 shows that those assurances were false.

“We believe the McCullough review and the Policing Board were deliberately misled by the PSNI to prevent any proper investigation into spying against journalists prior to 2011.

“It is now clear that Angus McCullough was only allowed to investigate a fraction of the spying that went on against journalists. What possible benefit to public confidence in policing is that?”

By December 2025 the McCullough review had cost £750,000. The barrister is expected to produce further findings next year, but will not be allowed to investigate any PSNI spying against journalists prior to 2011.

Mr Birney further questioned the chief constable’s claims that there is no evidence that the PSNI has continued spying on journalists since 2015.

“It is crystal clear from our case that Barry McCaffrey and myself were under unlawful PSNI surveillance in August 2018. Disclosure in our legal case also showed that PSNI monitored the mobile phone of one BBC Spotlight journalist in March 2022.

“In 2024 the PSNI confirmed that monitoring of journalist calls had only been suspended in March 2023 when our legal case became public knowledge. So, for Jon Boutcher to claim that no journalist was being spied on after 2015 is simply untrue.”

Advising any journalist against accepting any PSNI offer of informal briefings, McCaffrey said:

“Any reporter who is prepared to accept any informal assurance from Jon Boutcher that everything is fine and there is nothing to worry about is doing a major disservice to the journalistic profession.

“Only a proper, independent, judge-led inquiry into PSNI and security services surveillance against journalists is acceptable. That is the only thing that will restore the serious damage which the PSNI and security services has already done to public confidence in policing.

“Mr Boutcher’s offers of informal chats with individual journalists is an insult to our profession and no self-respecting journalist should accept any such offer.”

 https://www.thedetail.tv/articles/journalists-warn-against-psni-chief-s-offers-amid-spying-allegations

Thursday, July 30, 2026

Chris Noble was appointed to Humberside Police in 2017 before going on to become chief constable of Staffordshire Police in October 2021...

A senior police officer is facing an investigation into his conduct at the time he was operating at the top of Humberside Police. The Independent Office for Police Conduct (IPOC) – the watchdog which oversees complaints in England and Wales – was already investigating Chris Noble and has now launched two further probes – one of which relates to his time as assistant chief constable of Humberside Police.

Initial investigations into Mr Noble – but not related to his time at Humberside Police – followed concerns about his behaviour outside of work, and led to his suspension last August from his current role as chief constable of Staffordshire Police. There was also separate scrutiny of allegations that Mr Noble shared confidential information without a policing purpose.

The investigations came after referrals from Staffordshire’s Office of the Police, Fire & Crime Commissioner in April, June and July last year. At the time the IOPC action came to light, the Chief Police Officers’ Staff Association (CPOSA) said Mr Noble “completely and categorically denies any wrongdoing”, and that the association would continue to co-operate fully with the IOPC investigation.

Now, two further conduct investigations have been launched into Mr Noble. A CPOSA spokesperson said: “Mr Noble continues to engage fully with the IOPC investigation.”

An IOPC spokesperson, said: “The investigations relate to behaviour while on duty and/or on police premises while serving as assistant chief constable at Humberside Police in 2021, and during his time as chief constable with Staffordshire Police in 2024 and then in 2025.

“Mr Noble has been served notice that he is under investigation for potential gross misconduct. Our investigation will consider if he may have breached police professional standards relating to discreditable conduct and duties and responsibilities.

“The serving of notices does not necessarily mean disciplinary proceedings will follow. At the end of our investigations we will decide if he has a case to answer and should face disciplinary proceedings.

“We are continuing to investigate Mr Noble in relation to separate allegations that were referred to us by Staffordshire’s Office for the Police, Fire & Crime Commissioner in April, June and July last year. Those referrals relate to reports that raised serious concerns over Mr Noble’s behaviour outside of his work duties.

“We are also investigating Mr Noble over allegations he shared confidential information without proper policing purpose. That followed a referral in 2024 from the Office of the Police, Fire & Crime Commissioner for Staffordshire.

“Our enquiries into all matters are ongoing.”

Mr Noble was appointed to the Humberside force in 2017 and left in December 2021 when he took up the top ranking job at Staffordshire Police. Staffordshire police and fire commissioner Ben Adams previously said his decision to suspend Mr Noble was a “neutral act” and has “no bearing on any indication of guilt”.

More - 
 https://yorkshiredirectory.co.uk/2026/03/04/former-humberside-police-assistant-chief-constable-faces-misconduct-probes/

The full KPMG Australia scandal timeline...

The KPMG Australia scandal began with a whistleblower’s 2024 allegations that senior partners misused confidential Lendlease board documents to gain an unfair edge in winning major audit mandates, including Westpac.

The story exploded into the open in 2026 after parliamentary revelations, a firm admission that internal investigations “fell short,” multiple leadership exits, fresh admissions of further breaches (including Optus-related material), regulator action, and mounting client and government fallout.

It also fits a broader Australian pattern, in which the Big Four have been forced to confront the consequences of treating confidentiality, independence, and oversight as problems to manage after the fact rather than standards to protect from the start.

The scandal has put reform back on the table, reviving proposals that were floated after the PwC tax leaks scandal but went nowhere at the time — including tougher independence rules, stronger whistleblower protections, tighter oversight, and a harder line on separating audit from consulting.

Timeline of a Scandal

June and August 2023KPMG partners twice access a Lendlease folder containing confidential material relating to audit bids submitted by rival firms EY and PwC. The material later becomes part of KPMG’s preparations for its attempt to win the Westpac audit.

10 October 2023 — Seven people from KPMG’s audit business meet to help prepare partner Kim Lawry for the Westpac audit tender. During the meeting, confidential material taken from Lendlease board papers is displayed, including an assessment of rival bids submitted by EY and PwC.

6 November 2023The “Lunchgate” incident occurs at KPMG’s Barangaroo office, during KPMG’s pursuit of the Dexus external audit. According to the whistleblower, partner Jeff O’Sullivan said he would go to lunch and leave his laptop open on confidential Dexus internal-audit material so members of the bid team could view it. KPMG later said the remark was intended as a joke and that it found no evidence the information was actually shared, but sanctioned O’Sullivan for making an inappropriate remark.

Late 2023–March 2024 — Westpac audit tender raises conflict-of-interest questions.
During Westpac’s audit tender, Peter Nash, Westpac’s audit committee chair and a former KPMG Australia national chairman, attended audit pitch meetings. KPMG chair Martin Sheppard later told a parliamentary hearing that Nash had stayed at his house during the pitching process, describing him as a long-standing friend. Westpac said Nash declared his KPMG links and was not on the selection committee, but later acknowledged the perception of bias created by those relationships.

More -
https://www.big4news.com/p/the-full-kpmg-australia-scandal-timeline

Wednesday, July 22, 2026

Social worker who stole £10,000 from client spared jail...

A social worker who stole £10,000 from a man she had met when he was a client has been handed a suspended prison sentence.

Tabitha Hall was a senior social worker, responsible for managing supervisors who run social workers in the north of the county.

As part of that role, she worked with the man when he was a client but after his social care was stopped, she continued to visit him weekly without any authority.

The man then employed a personal assistant to help him and he told her that Hall had taken two separate amounts of £5,000 from his bank account and transferred it to hers.

An investigation was launched with Hall being suspended from her role. Police were called and in an interview, Hall told officers that she continued to see the man as his unofficial social worker and friend.

She said the first £5,000 she took was to pay for her child’s new boiler and the second was because her debt was getting out of hand so she asked to extend the ‘loan’.

In a victim impact statement, the man said: “I am struggling to sleep due to this happening to me and my anxiety level is now very high.

“I trusted her and she was my friend. She has let me down and betrayed me.”

Hall, 42, of Springbank Road, Chesterfield, was subsequently charged with fraud by abuse of position.

More - 
 https://www.derbyshire.police.uk/news/derbyshire/news/news/north/2026/july/social-worker-who-stole-10000-from-client-spared-jail/

Sunday, July 19, 2026

RSA Whistleblower Files...

Meridian Legal Services had forced RSA / Intact Insurance UK into a regulatory hold. Financial Ombudsman Service had the insurer’s internal case file. An investigator was about to be assigned.

This is the recap. If you’ve read all 112 episodes, most of this will be familiar - think of it as the file you’d hand someone new, or the one you’d want on record. If you’ve never read a single one, this is the whole thing, without needing to open 112 tabs.

One more thing before I start. Every section below ends with the specific episode numbers that section is drawn from. That’s deliberate.

If you’re a journalist, a lawyer, another policyholder, or just someone who wants to check a claim against the original documents rather than take my word for it, those episode numbers are your way in. Click through to the relevant number and you’ll find the actual emails, metadata, letters, and regulator correspondence behind whatever I’ve summarised here. Nothing in this episode is meant to stand on its own - it’s a map, not the territory.

(Covered in: EP109, EP110, EP111, EP112)


Who I am and how this started

I’m Artur. I’m a CNC programmer from Birmingham. I work with CNC precision machining. Numbers, tolerances, measurements that either match the drawing or they don’t.

In September 2020, I noticed a crack running through my kitchen wall. Then more, outside, where my house meets the neighbour’s. Subsidence. I called my insurer, RSA, and reported it, expecting the process to be roughly what it says on the tin: investigate, find the cause, fix it.

Almost six years later, I’m still living with cracks in the walls. Along the way I found something I didn’t expect to find ...

(Covered in: EP1, “I never planned to be a whistleblower,” “How an insurance fight took space inside my family life,” “What 1,000 cases and 100 episodes taught me”)


The moment everything changed: a Subject Access Request (DSAR)

In November 2024, I did something every UK resident is entitled to do under GDPR: I asked my insurer for a copy of everything they held on me - a Data Subject Access Request, or DSAR.

What came back didn’t match my memory of the last four years.

There were complaints in the file that I never made. There were documents dated years earlier than the metadata said they were created. There were 73 files redacted so completely that even my own emails, sent back to me, had been blacked out. Dozens more were simply missing. Around 140 files witheld.

I’m not a lawyer, a journalist, or an investigator by training. I’m someone who reads technical drawings for a living, so when the paperwork stopped matching the timeline, I noticed, and I started keeping a forensic record of every discrepancy - dates, metadata, reference numbers, who sent what and when.

That record became this series.

(Covered in: EP1, EP2, EP3)


The three complaints I never made. Fabricated by Insurers.

Three complaints appear in RSA’s records under my name:

• 30 January 2024 (ref 01/24540759)

• 26 September 2024 (ref 09/24576994)

• 7 December 2024 (ref 12/24587074)

None of them has a contact record, a complaint form, or a verification trail behind it. The third one, RSA’s own correspondence shows, was built from what was actually a routine follow-up email to their Data Protection Officer about my DSAR - not a complaint at all.

Here’s the pattern that took me months to see clearly: every one of those three dates was followed, within days, by RSA’s standard “Thank you for contacting us” acknowledgment letter. My two genuine, recorded-delivery complaints - 2 October and 16 December 2024 - never received one.

I started calling that letter the fraud marker. It only ever showed up after something I didn’t send.

Why would a company do this? My own theory, laid out across dozens of episodes with the paperwork attached: each fabricated complaint gave RSA a new reference number and a new start date, which let them argue they’d already dealt with an issue, or that a deadline hadn’t been missed, or that my real complaint could be filed away as a duplicate of one that never happened.

(Covered in: EP4, EP5, EP7, EP12, EP13, EP21, EP24, EP25, EP26, EP27, EP28, EP29)


The documents fabricated in 83 minutes

On 30 April 2024, three documents appeared in my claim file: a Schedule of Works, a Certificate of Structural Adequacy, and a Form of Acceptance. Carried dates suggesting they were years old - 2021, specifically.

The metadata said otherwise. Created and modified within an 83-minute window, on 30 April 2024, by the same member of staff.

The Certificate of Structural Adequacy went further: it credited a specific engineer’s advice for a tree-removal decision made in 2021. That engineer wasn’t hired until 2023. He couldn’t have advised on something that happened two years before he was involved. I flagged this in writing, repeatedly.

RSA’s response, when it eventually came in a Final Decision Letter, called this “poor attention to detail.” A later Ombudsman decision called it “simple human error.” Neither addressed how a document can be authored in 2021 and modified in 2024 at the same time, or how an engineer can advise on an event that predates his involvement by two years.

(Covered in: EP6, EP8, EP9, EP17, EP18, EP19, EP20, EP31, EP36, EP69, EP70)


The files that vanished, and the ones that were blacked out

My DSAR should have returned a complete file. Instead: 73 documents fully redacted (including, again, my own outgoing emails), and by my count somewhere 70+ further documents missing outright - concentrated, tellingly, around the period of the fabricated September complaint.

One example I’ve come back to more than once: a site-visit report, released to me with every line redacted except one - “The entire meeting was video recorded by the insured’s son.” That sentence survived. Everything describing what was found at the visit did not.

I complained to the ICO twice. Both times, I’ll walk you through what happened to that complaint in a moment.

(Covered in: EP11, EP37, EP45, EP46, EP95)


Round two: the same pattern, in the monitoring data

I assumed, for a while, that the fabrication problem belonged to 2024. Then, in 2025, RSA (rebranding mid-dispute to Intact Insurance UK) ran a six-month monitoring programme on a second problem tree - referred to throughout the series as T5 - that a regulator had specifically ordered them to investigate.

The monitoring point closest to T5 moved 2.3mm downward over six months, with zero recovery across all seven readings - the largest, most one-directional movement of any monitored point on the property. I was told this proved “stability.”

When I asked for the original monitoring files, the April data arrived as a full spreadsheet, properly attributed to the surveying firm. Every month after that arrived only as a PDF: no author, creation dates over a week after the actual survey, and - I later discovered - one of them containing invisible text, embedded but not displayed, findable only by selecting the page and pasting it into a plain text editor.

I don’t think that happens by accident.

(Covered in: EP76, EP77, EP78, EP82, EP83, EP84, EP85, EP86, EP87, EP88, EP89, EP90, EP91, EP92, EP93, EP94)


What FOS did with all of this

This is the part of the story that, honestly, took the longest to accept.

The Financial Ombudsman Service is the free, independent service that’s supposed to resolve exactly this kind of dispute. Over five-plus years, I brought them the fabricated complaints, the backdated documents, and the manipulated monitoring data, more than once, in detail, with evidence attached.

Here’s what I got back, in the regulator’s own words, at different points in the case:

“Artur, I cannot do anything” - the first investigator, when shown proof a complaint had been fabricated, told me it would need to be raised as a brand-new complaint rather than folded into the case already open.

“Your further supporting evidence… hasn’t changed my review of the complaint” - a second investigator, 72 hours after receiving over 500 pages of forensic evidence.

On the backdated Schedule of Works: the Ombudsman accepted RSA’s explanation that the date was a “printing error” - that downloading or printing a document stamps today’s date on it - despite the file’s own metadata recording a creation date, not a print date.

On the false attribution to an engineer who wasn’t hired until two years later: “I can’t see any detriment that Mr N has suffered as a result of this minor and relatively insignificant error.”

Most recently, on the T5 monitoring question: between 19 December 2025 and 15 January 2026, one investigator gave me four different positions on whether RSA had complied with a binding order - non-compliant, then not non-compliant, then “up to the discretion of the investigator,” then a specific evidence threshold I’d already met weeks earlier, then finally: “So, it’s a new complaint. I hope that helps.”

A Freedom of Information request I filed to understand FOS’s own fraud-handling procedures took over a year, three refusals, and a phantom reference number generated for a request I never made, before I learned something that explained a lot: FOS’s own case-management system doesn’t record “document fabrication” as a complaint category at all.

(Covered in: EP14, EP15, EP21, EP40, EP41, EP55, EP56, EP57, EP58, EP59, EP60, EP61, EP62, EP63, EP67, EP68, EP69, EP70, EP71, EP72, EP73, EP74, EP75, EP79, EP80, EP97, EP98, EP99, EP100, EP101, EP102, EP103, EP104, EP105, EP106, EP107, EP108)


What ICO did with it

The Information Commissioner's Office exists to enforce data protection law. I sent them the 73 redacted files, the missing documents, and evidence my data had been shared with third parties without a clear lawful basis.

Their first outcome: they said they were “unable to determine” whether RSA had complied with the law, and asked RSA’s own Data Protection Officer to review RSA’s own handling and report back in 14 days. RSA’s DPO’s review concluded the redactions were “appropriate.” That was accepted, no further questions asked.

When I filed a second, far more detailed complaint months later - 350-plus pages, covering everything the first complaint hadn’t - the ICO closed it as a “duplicate” of the first, without reviewing the new evidence.

(Covered in: EP46, EP64, EP65, EP66, EP81, EP95)


What FCA and SFO did with it

Both were copied on nearly every escalation in this case from January 2025 onward: the fraud alerts, the formal complaints, an open offer of full access to my underlying evidence. Neither is on record, anywhere in this series, taking a documented substantive action.

(Covered in: EP22, EP24, EP27, EP29, EP43, EP47, EP51, EP52, “When Every Watchdog in Britain Suddenly Goes Blind”)


Why I don’t think this is just about me

Two things convinced me this isn’t a one-off.

First: in 2023, a legal representative named Gary Smith won a landmark High Court case against FOS over roughly £500 million in mis-sold timeshare compensation for around 20,000 families. After he won, by his account, the compensation largely didn’t get paid - and at least 26 of his clients died still waiting. He’s now preparing a second judicial review, built on more than 1,000 documented FOS cases.

Second: reviews from FOS’s own current and former staff describe an organisation under pressure to hit closure targets set by executives who, in one reviewer’s words, “have never worked a day in the Investigator role” - producing, in that reviewer’s phrase, “rushed, sloppy investigations.”

None of that proves my case. But it’s hard to read alongside everything above and conclude I just had unusually bad luck three separate times, with three separate regulators.

(Covered in: EP98, “ONE LEGAL EXPERT EXPOSED THE UK CONSUMER PROTECTION FRAUD,” “THE WATCHDOG HAS NO TEETH,” “What 1,000 cases and 100 episodes taught me”)


Where things stand now

As of this episode: Claim 202009030674 remains on official regulatory hold. RSA/Intact’s contractor has been stood down. All demands for site access have been withdrawn. 

 https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/ep113-rsa-whistleblower-files-whole-story-so-far-six-years-nadolny-dov2e/

Sanctions against PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP and Mr John Waters...

This Press notice concerns the outcome of an investigation into the relevant Statutory Audit Firm and Statutory Auditor (as defined in the FRC’s Audit Enforcement Procedure). It would not be fair to treat any part of this announcement as constituting or evidencing an investigation into, or findings in respect of the conduct of, any other persons or entities.

Executive Counsel of the Financial Reporting Council (FRC) has issued a Final Settlement Decision Notice (FSDN) under the Audit Enforcement Procedure and imposed sanctions against PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP (PwC) and John Waters, audit engagement partner, in relation to the statutory audit of the consolidated financial statements of Babcock International Group Plc (Babcock) for the financial years ended 31 March 2019 (FY2019) and 31 March 2020 (FY2020).

The sanctions are:

PwC:

  • A financial sanction of £3,248,437 (this figure reflects a starting point of £5,500,000, discounted for the mitigating factor of exceptional cooperation by 12.5%, and further discounted for admissions and early disposal by 32.5%);
  • A published statement in the form of a Severe Reprimand;
  • An order requiring PwC to take specified action with the aim of preventing the recurrence of the contravention; and
  • A declaration that the FY2019 and FY2020 Audit reports signed on behalf of PwC did not satisfy the Relevant Requirements in relation to the matters set out in the FSDN.

Mr Waters:

  • A financial sanction of £59,062 (this figure reflects a starting point of

£100,000, discounted for the mitigating factor of exceptional cooperation by 12.5%, and further discounted for admissions and disposal by 32.5%).

  • A published statement in the form of a Severe Reprimand; and
  • A declaration that the FY2019 and FY2020 Audit reports signed on behalf of PwC did not satisfy the Relevant Requirements in relation to the matters set out in the FSDN.

PwC will also pay Executive Counsel’s costs of the investigation.

Babcock is a Public Interest Entity (PIE). It is a multinational corporation headquartered in the UK, and its shares are listed on the Main Market of the London Stock Exchange. It provides engineering services and other services (in the UK and internationally) in relation to maintaining, upgrading, operating and managing significant infrastructure and essential equipment. A number of its contracts are UK government contracts, including contracts with the Ministry of Defence.

PwC and Mr Waters have admitted serious and numerous breaches[[1] ] of Relevant Requirements in relation to the auditing of cash pooling; financing arrangements in relation to a specific overseas contract; capitalisation of certain costs on aircraft; an intangible asset; assessment of goodwill impairment; certain credit notes on aircraft; and two long-term contracts, across both audit years. Material restatements were made in the FY2021 financial statements to correct prior period errors associated with some of the breach areas.

PwC and Mr Waters failed to exercise adequate professional scepticism and to obtain sufficient appropriate audit evidence in all those areas of the audits, and to achieve fair presentation and compliance with accounting standards in five areas. In these areas, they failed adequately to challenge management as to whether management’s accounting approach was compliant with the financial reporting framework, and demonstrated an insufficient audit response to the risk of material misstatement.

With regard to Mr Waters’ position, he faced severe challenges in discharging his responsibilities as audit engagement partner, including as a consequence of being appointed to the FY2019 Audit at short notice, after the audit had commenced, and not having had the opportunity for any handover from his predecessor. The COVID-19 pandemic made the FY2020 Audit significantly more difficult.

As part of the sanctions accepted by PwC, PwC has agreed to examine and report to the FRC on aspects of its processes in respect of the change of audit engagement partners during an ongoing audit and the response to indicators of increasing audit risk during an engagement.

The Respondents’ exceptional level of cooperation during the investigation by Executive Counsel of the breaches is demonstrated by the following facts and matters:

  • PwC undertook two separate critical self-reviews of different areas of the FY2019 and FY2020 audits at the request of Executive Counsel, and disclosed their findings to Executive Counsel;
  • PwC undertook a Root Cause Analysis to identify the underlying causes of the audit failings, and disclosed their findings to Executive Counsel; and
  • Mr Waters participated fully in the self-reviews and Root Cause Analysis and fully co-operated with Executive Counsel’s investigation.

“In March 2023, the FRC announced sanctions against PwC and two audit engagement partners in relation to the FY2017 and FY2018 audits of Babcock and one of its subsidiaries.

Following a separate investigation in relation to the FY2019 and FY2020 audits, PwC and the new audit engagement partner appointed in relation to those financial years have admitted serious and numerous breaches. These included significant contraventions of the fundamental requirements to perform an audit with adequate professional scepticism and to evaluate effectively whether the financial statements complied with accounting standards and achieved fair presentation of the underlying transactions. The quality of these audits fell short of the standards expected of statutory auditors.

The FRC acknowledges that the audit engagement partner assumed his role in FY2019 in challenging circumstances. In such circumstances, however, the firm and the audit engagement partner should together have ensured that those challenges were appropriately addressed, and the audit work performed in accordance with applicable standards.”

Penrose Foss, Executive Counsel:

Read the Final Settlement Decision Notice.

 https://www.frc.org.uk/news-and-events/news/2026/07/sanctions-against-pricewaterhousecoopers-llp-and-mr-john-waters/

Thursday, July 16, 2026

The Pandora Papers.

The Pandora Papers are 11.9 million leaked documents with 2.9 terabytes of data that the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists (ICIJ) published beginning on 3 October 2021.[1][2][3] The leak exposed the secret offshore accounts of 35 world leaders, including current and former presidents, prime ministers, and heads of state as well as more than 100 business leaders, billionaires, and celebrities. The news organizations of the ICIJ described the document leak as their most expansive exposé of financial secrecy yet, containing documents, images, emails and spreadsheets from 14 financial service companies, in nations including Panama, Switzerland and the United Arab Emirates.[4][5] The size of the leak surpassed their previous release of the Panama Papers in 2016, which had 11.5 million confidential documents and 2.6 terabytes of data.[6][7][8][9][10] The ICIJ has not named its source for the documents.[11]

The ICIJ estimates that the total global amount of money held offshore (outside the country where the money was made) is between US$5.6 trillion and US$32 trillion.[3][12][13]

Disclosures

In total, 35 current and former national leaders appear in the leak, alongside 400 public officials from nearly 100 countries and more than 100 billionaires.[14] Some of the activities were legal according to the countries' respective tax laws.[11] The majority of the files were dated from 1996 to 2020, with some older documents dating back to 1970.[15] The data included 130 billionaires listed by Forbes, over 330 politicians, celebrities, members of royal families, and religious leaders.

Among those named are former British Prime Minister Tony Blair, Chilean President Sebastián Piñera, former Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta, Montenegrin President Milo Đukanović, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, Qatari Emir Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani, the United Arab Emirates Prime Minister and Dubai ruler Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum, Gabonese President Ali Bongo Ondimba, Lebanese Prime Minister Najib Mikati,[16] Ecuadorian President Guillermo Lasso, family members of former Argentine President Mauricio Macri and his spin-doctor, Ecuadorian Jaime Durán Barba,[17][18][19] and Cypriot President Nicos Anastasiades.[20][21] More than 100 billionaires, 29,000 offshore accounts, 30 current and former leaders, and 336 politicians[22] were named in the first leaks on 3 October 2021...

More - 
 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pandora_Papers