Meridian Legal Services had forced RSA / Intact Insurance UK into a regulatory hold. Financial Ombudsman Service had the insurer’s internal case file. An investigator was about to be assigned.
This is the recap. If you’ve read all 112 episodes, most of this
will be familiar - think of it as the file you’d hand someone new, or
the one you’d want on record. If you’ve never read a single one, this is
the whole thing, without needing to open 112 tabs.
One more thing before I start. Every section below ends with the
specific episode numbers that section is drawn from. That’s deliberate.
If you’re a journalist, a lawyer, another policyholder, or just
someone who wants to check a claim against the original documents rather
than take my word for it, those episode numbers are your way in. Click
through to the relevant number and you’ll find the actual emails,
metadata, letters, and regulator correspondence behind whatever I’ve
summarised here. Nothing in this episode is meant to stand on its own -
it’s a map, not the territory.
(Covered in: EP109, EP110, EP111, EP112)
Who I am and how this started
I’m Artur. I’m a CNC programmer from Birmingham. I work with CNC
precision machining. Numbers, tolerances, measurements that either match
the drawing or they don’t.
In September 2020, I noticed a crack running through my kitchen
wall. Then more, outside, where my house meets the neighbour’s.
Subsidence. I called my insurer, RSA, and reported it, expecting the
process to be roughly what it says on the tin: investigate, find the
cause, fix it.
Almost six years later, I’m still living with cracks in the walls. Along the way I found something I didn’t expect to find ...
(Covered in: EP1, “I never planned to be a whistleblower,” “How an insurance fight took space inside my family life,” “What 1,000 cases and 100 episodes taught me”)
The moment everything changed: a Subject Access Request (DSAR)
In November 2024, I did something every UK resident is entitled to
do under GDPR: I asked my insurer for a copy of everything they held on
me - a Data Subject Access Request, or DSAR.
What came back didn’t match my memory of the last four years.
There were complaints in the file that I never made. There were
documents dated years earlier than the metadata said they were created.
There were 73 files redacted so completely that even my own emails, sent
back to me, had been blacked out. Dozens more were simply missing.
Around 140 files witheld.
I’m not a lawyer, a journalist, or an investigator by training.
I’m someone who reads technical drawings for a living, so when the
paperwork stopped matching the timeline, I noticed, and I started
keeping a forensic record of every discrepancy - dates, metadata,
reference numbers, who sent what and when.
That record became this series.
(Covered in: EP1, EP2, EP3)
The three complaints I never made. Fabricated by Insurers.
Three complaints appear in RSA’s records under my name:
• 30 January 2024 (ref 01/24540759)
• 26 September 2024 (ref 09/24576994)
• 7 December 2024 (ref 12/24587074)
None of them has a contact record, a complaint form, or a
verification trail behind it. The third one, RSA’s own correspondence
shows, was built from what was actually a routine follow-up email to
their Data Protection Officer about my DSAR - not a complaint at all.
Here’s the pattern that took me months to see clearly: every one
of those three dates was followed, within days, by RSA’s standard “Thank you for contacting us” acknowledgment letter. My two genuine, recorded-delivery complaints - 2 October and 16 December 2024 - never received one.
I started calling that letter the fraud marker. It only ever showed up after something I didn’t send.
Why would a company do this? My own theory, laid out across dozens
of episodes with the paperwork attached: each fabricated complaint gave
RSA a new reference number and a new start date, which let them argue
they’d already dealt with an issue, or that a deadline hadn’t been
missed, or that my real complaint could be filed away as a duplicate of
one that never happened.
(Covered in: EP4, EP5, EP7, EP12, EP13, EP21, EP24, EP25, EP26, EP27, EP28, EP29)
The documents fabricated in 83 minutes
On 30 April 2024, three documents appeared in my claim file: a Schedule of Works, a Certificate of Structural Adequacy, and a Form of Acceptance. Carried dates suggesting they were years old - 2021, specifically.
The metadata said otherwise. Created and modified within an 83-minute window, on 30 April 2024, by the same member of staff.
The Certificate of Structural Adequacy went further: it credited a
specific engineer’s advice for a tree-removal decision made in 2021.
That engineer wasn’t hired until 2023. He couldn’t have advised on
something that happened two years before he was involved. I flagged this
in writing, repeatedly.
RSA’s response, when it eventually came in a Final Decision Letter, called this “poor attention to detail.” A later Ombudsman decision called it “simple human error.” Neither
addressed how a document can be authored in 2021 and modified in 2024
at the same time, or how an engineer can advise on an event that
predates his involvement by two years.
(Covered in: EP6, EP8, EP9, EP17, EP18, EP19, EP20, EP31, EP36, EP69, EP70)
The files that vanished, and the ones that were blacked out
My DSAR should have returned a complete file. Instead: 73
documents fully redacted (including, again, my own outgoing emails), and
by my count somewhere 70+ further documents missing outright -
concentrated, tellingly, around the period of the fabricated September
complaint.
One example I’ve come back to more than once: a site-visit report, released to me with every line redacted except one - “The entire meeting was video recorded by the insured’s son.” That sentence survived. Everything describing what was found at the visit did not.
I complained to the ICO twice. Both times, I’ll walk you through what happened to that complaint in a moment.
(Covered in: EP11, EP37, EP45, EP46, EP95)
Round two: the same pattern, in the monitoring data
I assumed, for a while, that the fabrication problem belonged to
2024. Then, in 2025, RSA (rebranding mid-dispute to Intact Insurance UK)
ran a six-month monitoring programme on a second problem tree -
referred to throughout the series as T5 - that a regulator had
specifically ordered them to investigate.
The monitoring point closest to T5 moved 2.3mm downward over six
months, with zero recovery across all seven readings - the largest, most
one-directional movement of any monitored point on the property. I was
told this proved “stability.”
When I asked for the original monitoring files, the April data
arrived as a full spreadsheet, properly attributed to the surveying
firm. Every month after that arrived only as a PDF: no author, creation
dates over a week after the actual survey, and - I later discovered -
one of them containing invisible text, embedded but not displayed,
findable only by selecting the page and pasting it into a plain text
editor.
I don’t think that happens by accident.
(Covered in: EP76, EP77, EP78, EP82, EP83, EP84, EP85, EP86, EP87, EP88, EP89, EP90, EP91, EP92, EP93, EP94)
What FOS did with all of this
This is the part of the story that, honestly, took the longest to accept.
The Financial Ombudsman Service is the free, independent service
that’s supposed to resolve exactly this kind of dispute. Over five-plus
years, I brought them the fabricated complaints, the backdated
documents, and the manipulated monitoring data, more than once, in
detail, with evidence attached.
Here’s what I got back, in the regulator’s own words, at different points in the case:
“Artur, I cannot do anything” -
the first investigator, when shown proof a complaint had been
fabricated, told me it would need to be raised as a brand-new complaint
rather than folded into the case already open.
“Your further supporting evidence… hasn’t changed my review of the complaint” - a second investigator, 72 hours after receiving over 500 pages of forensic evidence.
On the backdated Schedule of Works: the Ombudsman accepted RSA’s explanation that the date was a “printing error” -
that downloading or printing a document stamps today’s date on it -
despite the file’s own metadata recording a creation date, not a print
date.
On the false attribution to an engineer who wasn’t hired until two years later: “I can’t see any detriment that Mr N has suffered as a result of this minor and relatively insignificant error.”
Most recently, on the T5 monitoring question: between 19 December
2025 and 15 January 2026, one investigator gave me four different
positions on whether RSA had complied with a binding order -
non-compliant, then not non-compliant, then “up to the discretion of the
investigator,” then a specific evidence threshold I’d already met weeks
earlier, then finally: “So, it’s a new complaint. I hope that helps.”
A Freedom of Information request I filed to understand FOS’s own
fraud-handling procedures took over a year, three refusals, and a
phantom reference number generated for a request I never made, before I
learned something that explained a lot: FOS’s own case-management system
doesn’t record “document fabrication” as a complaint category at all.
(Covered in: EP14, EP15, EP21, EP40, EP41, EP55, EP56, EP57, EP58, EP59, EP60, EP61, EP62, EP63, EP67, EP68, EP69, EP70, EP71, EP72, EP73, EP74, EP75, EP79, EP80, EP97, EP98, EP99, EP100, EP101, EP102, EP103, EP104, EP105, EP106, EP107, EP108)
What ICO did with it
The Information Commissioner's Office exists
to enforce data protection law. I sent them the 73 redacted files, the
missing documents, and evidence my data had been shared with third
parties without a clear lawful basis.
Their first outcome: they said they were “unable to determine”
whether RSA had complied with the law, and asked RSA’s own Data
Protection Officer to review RSA’s own handling and report back in 14
days. RSA’s DPO’s review concluded the redactions were “appropriate.”
That was accepted, no further questions asked.
When I filed a second, far more detailed complaint months later -
350-plus pages, covering everything the first complaint hadn’t - the ICO
closed it as a “duplicate” of the first, without reviewing the new
evidence.
(Covered in: EP46, EP64, EP65, EP66, EP81, EP95)
What FCA and SFO did with it
Both were copied on nearly every escalation in this case from
January 2025 onward: the fraud alerts, the formal complaints, an open
offer of full access to my underlying evidence. Neither is on record,
anywhere in this series, taking a documented substantive action.
(Covered in: EP22, EP24, EP27, EP29, EP43, EP47, EP51, EP52, “When Every Watchdog in Britain Suddenly Goes Blind”)
Why I don’t think this is just about me
Two things convinced me this isn’t a one-off.
First: in 2023, a legal representative named Gary Smith won
a landmark High Court case against FOS over roughly £500 million in
mis-sold timeshare compensation for around 20,000 families. After he
won, by his account, the compensation largely didn’t get paid - and at
least 26 of his clients died still waiting. He’s now preparing a second
judicial review, built on more than 1,000 documented FOS cases.
Second: reviews from FOS’s own current and former staff describe
an organisation under pressure to hit closure targets set by executives
who, in one reviewer’s words, “have never worked a day in the
Investigator role” - producing, in that reviewer’s phrase, “rushed,
sloppy investigations.”
None of that proves my case. But it’s hard to read alongside
everything above and conclude I just had unusually bad luck three
separate times, with three separate regulators.
(Covered in: EP98, “ONE LEGAL EXPERT EXPOSED THE UK CONSUMER PROTECTION FRAUD,” “THE WATCHDOG HAS NO TEETH,” “What 1,000 cases and 100 episodes taught me”)
Where things stand now
As of this episode: Claim 202009030674 remains on official
regulatory hold. RSA/Intact’s contractor has been stood down. All
demands for site access have been withdrawn.
https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/ep113-rsa-whistleblower-files-whole-story-so-far-six-years-nadolny-dov2e/
